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Decisions in medical contexts have immediate and obvious consequences in terms of 
health and sometimes death or survival. Medical decisions also have less obvious and 
less immediate consequences, including effects on the long-term physical and mental 
well-being of patients, their families and of care-givers, as well as on the distribution of 
scarce medical resources. Some of these consequences are hard to measure and estimate. 
Even harder, perhaps, is the determination of the relative value of different 
consequences. How should consequences be evaluated? How do uncertainties and 
biases affect our evaluations of consequences? What influence should our evaluations of 
consequences have on our actions? These questions are all philosophical in nature. 
 
Consequences and value 
To evaluate something is most basically to determine its value, or to determine its effect 
on that which has value. The positive value of health may be taken as a given in medical 
decision making. Sometimes, however, it is not clear what concrete outcomes contain 
more health. Will a patient in chronic pain be more healthy taking opiates that reduce 
her mental abilities and may create dependency, or will she be more healthy without 
opiates but with more pain? Will an elderly patient with myeloma enjoy better health 
after treatment with cytostatics that pacify the disease but weaken the immune system, 
or will her health be better without the treatment? Depending on the details of the case, 
the answers to these questions are far from obvious, showing that the concept of health 
is complex and will sometimes stand in need of specification. 
Health may be defined biomedically as the absence of disease and infirmity. 
This is the common definition in medical practice, though seldom explicitly stated. 
Alternatively, health may be defined biopsychosocially, which is common in theoretical 
contexts. The 1946 constitution of the World Health Organization states that health is “a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being”. Several recent definitions aim 
to avoid the somewhat utopian character of the WHO definition and to shift focus from 
outcome to opportunity, by defining health in terms of potential or ability rather than 
well-being.  
Quantitative measurements of health have increasingly been made in terms of 
QALYs – quality adjusted life years, that is the number of person life years adjusted by 
a factor representing the quality of the person’s life. Like health, quality of life may be 
defined biomedically or biopsychosocially, and more or less broadly. What will be said 
in the following about values in general and health in particular, holds equally for 
quality of life. Regardless of how exactly quality is defined, evaluating consequences in 
terms of QALYs incorporates a richer understanding of why we value life, as opposed 
to measuring only years of life of whatever quality, or only death or survival. A strategy 
of QALY maximization has the further advantage of allowing quantitative comparisons 
of different alternatives, such as treatment programs, but has the disadvantage that other 
values may be disregarded, such as equity and autonomy.  
Like any value, the value of health may be final and/or instrumental. Health is 
obviously instrumental to other values such as happiness and achievement. In other 
words, we need health in order to promote or protect these other values. In addition, 
however, health may also be of final value – of value in itself, independently of its 
impact on other values. Whether or not health has final value becomes important in 
conflict cases, where it must be balanced against other values. If, for example, health, 
defined biomedically, is important only because of its instrumental contribution to the 
higher value of happiness, a healthy life without happiness has no value. This 
conclusion may have direct relevance for important medical decisions concerning life 
and death, including the issue of euthanasia. 
Values may be subjective or objective. That the value of health is subjective 
would mean that health is of value only to the extent that the individual patient 
considers it to be of value, or to the extent that she desires it. That the value is objective, 
on the other hand, would mean that health may be of value despite the fact that the 
patient does not subjectively value it. That a value is objective does not mean that it is 
insensitive to individual preferences, since objective values depend on individual 
preferences indirectly. Even if happiness, for example, is objectively valuable, what 
makes people happy depends on their preferences. Similarly, even if health is 
objectively valuable, what makes people healthy will depend on their physical 
constitution and individual character, including preferences. Whether values are 
subjective or objective naturally affects how we should treat each other in medical and 
other contexts. 
Beyond the somewhat related values of health, quality of life, well-being and 
happiness, autonomy is arguably the main value relevant for medical decision making. 
This value is institutionalized through the practice of informed consent, but may be 
affected also in other ways. For example, addictions may be considered to decrease 
autonomy and so treatment of addiction may promote autonomy. Further values of 
possible relevance include dignity, equity, personal relationships, and perfection or 
excellence. Dignity may be relevant to hospice care and other care of dying patients, 
equity to any decision affecting the distribution of scarce medical resources, 
relationships to how families are treated and to decisions affecting the patients’ potential 
to uphold personal relationships after treatment, and perfection may be relevant to neo-
natal screening and genetic and medical enhancement. 
Which things have objective value, if any, is a fundamental philosophical 
question and opinions and theories diverge. Lacking agreement, we may look to social 
value as determined by willingness to pay or stated preference, or to politically, 
hopefully democratically, determined values, or to expert judgment, or to our own 
judgment. Again, opinions and theories diverge. What we can say, rather trivially, is 
that consequences of decisions should be evaluated in terms of those things that are 
determined to have value.  
If more than one value is affected by a decision, as seems likely for most 
medical decisions, we must determine how these values relate to each other. Most 
fundamentally, values may or may not be commensurable. If the value of health and the 
value of autonomy are incommensurable, we cannot weigh one against the other and so 
must make decisions that affect both values without guidance from such weighing. If 
the values are commensurable, they may be more or less open to comparison. At one 
end of the spectrum, we may know only that a little health is less important than a lot of 
autonomy, but not know how to compare much of each or little of each. At the other end 
of the spectrum, any amount of each value may be represented by a number and the 
values aggregated in multiattribute utility analysis. The very different character of some 
values may make them seem incommensurable, while the need to make decisions that 
affect more than one value forces us to compare them, or at least to act as if we had 
compared them.  
 
Uncertainties and biases 
In evaluating consequences, we are inescapably faced with a number of uncertainties 
and biases. It is widely recognized that we do not even know if established medical 
practice on the whole efficiently promotes best outcomes (though the growing field of 
outcomes research aims to address that question). The uncertainty is naturally greatest 
for consequences of decision not yet made. We often do not know what consequences 
will follow from alternative courses of action. In evaluating possible future 
consequences, these uncertainties can to some extent be handled by decision theoretical 
methods. If we are uncertain what consequences will follow, we may at least know, or 
be able to estimate approximately, the probabilities of different possible outcomes, each 
with a set of consequences. Given these probabilities, we may estimate the expected 
value of different alternatives. To a large extent, however, uncertainty about the future 
must simply be accepted as a fact of life. 
Uncertainty does not only pertain to future consequences, but also to the value 
of consequences, future as well as past and present. Even if we know that we value 
health and we know the consequences of a certain decision, we might not know to what 
extent those consequences further our values. This may be because we are not certain 
how exactly our values should be specified, or because we are not certain how much the 
concrete consequences contribute to our values, however thoroughly specified. For 
example, if health is defined in terms of ability we may not know to what extent 
successful treatment of radical mastectomy will contribute to this value. A person’s 
overall ability depends partly on her attitudes, and patients may react differently to this 
medical procedure even when the physical outcome is the same. 
Uncertainty about the value of consequences is increased by different sorts of 
biases. We tend to exaggerate the impact of certain things and belittle the impact of 
others. Some biases concerning our own well-being have been rather straightforwardly 
proven by psychological research. For example, we tend to overvalue variation in our 
consumption in the sense that we opt beforehand for variation but regret this once we 
get it. Other biases are harder to prove. For example and importantly, we value good 
things in the near future higher than similarly good things in the more distant future, and 
the reverse for bad things. This means for example that the social value of QALYs in 
the distant future is much lower than the social value of the same number and quality of 
life years in the near future. Whether this is an irrational bias that should be 
compensated for or an indication of our true values is a matter of controversy. 
Uncertainties about consequences introduce another level of value – it requires 
us to determine how much we value certainty. A program of maximization of expected 
QALYs presumes that one QALY for sure is as good as a one in two chance of two 
QALYs. This is not so if we are risk-averse, that is if we value goods that we are certain 
to get higher than goods we may or may not get, even when the expected value is the 
same. In fact, people tend to be risk-averse. However, this may be considered an 
irrational bias. 
 
Consequences and principles 
In bioethics, principles are often understood as non-rigid rules and recommendations 
that must be interpreted in concrete cases with a large dose of moral judgment. Such 
principles are essentially statements of what has value, with the add-on that we have a 
duty to promote or protect that value. The question of which bioethical principles there 
are and how they should be understood corresponds to the question of what values there 
are and how they should be understood. Whether one prefers duty-talk or value-talk 
depends on whether one finds duty or value to be the more fundamental moral category. 
This is another matter on which opinions or sentiments diverge.  
There are other kinds of principles, however, that do not as closely resemble 
values, but that rather regulate the evaluation of consequences. Some of these principles 
are rules of thumb, stating that for practical reasons such as time constraint and limited 
information and information processing capacity, we should restrict our evaluation of 
consequences in different ways. A rule that the most severely injured should be treated 
first may be such a rule. It is not a deep moral truth that the most severely injured 
deserves first treatment, but in most cases the rule is fair and efficient and reasonably 
easy to follow without time-consuming judgment. That this is a rule of thumb rather 
than a fundamental principle is shown by our reactions to the hypothetical case where 
there are obvious reasons to diverge from the rule, for example that it is clear that the 
most severely injured will not benefit from quick treatment while others will. If 
diverging from the rule in such circumstances is morally unproblematic, then the rule is 
one of thumb. By contrast, while a moral principle may be overridden, this is not 
unproblematic but normally give cause for regret and may give rise to residual 
obligations. 
Rules of thumb replace or restrict evaluations of consequences for practical 
reasons. Moral principles do so for moral reasons. There are essentially two sorts of 
moral principles. Action-focused principles, or side constraints, state that certain things 
must or may not be done, regardless of other consideration. Examples include general 
principles such as ‘never lie’ as well as specifically medical principles such as ‘never 
force medical care on a patient against her explicit wish’. Reason-focused or value-
focused principles, by contrast, state that certain reasons or values should be disregarded 
in the molding of various consideration into an all things considered judgment of what 
should be done. An example is the principle that a patient’s estimated future 
contribution to society should not influence our medical treatment of her. 
Many principles are tied to our social and legal roles, for example as medical 
practitioners. These roles come with social expectations, rules and laws, which regulate 
how and to what extent we must and may consider certain consequences of our actions. 
If such role principles are motivated only by expedience, they may be seen as rules of 
thumb. However, if they become ingrained in the culture of a society, they acquire the 
status of moral principles. Even as rules of thumb, role principles are unusually rigid, 
because they are motivated by practical reasons on a collective or system level. While 
individual practitioners may on occasion have time and capacity to judge a case on its 
own merits, they may be obliged to follow rules nonetheless, because this makes for 
stability and transparence in the medical system as a whole. The rigidity of role 
principles should not be exaggerated, however. The social and legal frameworks rarely 
if ever determine in detail how we should act and think. Even in applying well defined 
rules, we need value judgments to guide our application of those rules to particular 
circumstances. Furthermore, as rational and moral beings we can always question the 
social and legal framework within which we live and work.  
 
A model for evaluating consequences 
The different aspects of evaluating consequences covered above may be captured in the 
following model. This somewhat novel model incorporates a series of not so novel 
considerations. The model does not describe how evaluations are performed in practice, 
but rather proscribes what steps should be taken in order that all the aspects of 
evaluation discussed above be considered. In other words, the model is not 
psychological, but philosophical. If implemented in practice, the steps of the model 
should not necessarily be taken in strict order. In particular, step 2, 3 and 4 may all 
require glancing ahead to subsequent steps. 
    
1. Determine which things have value – i.e. which values there are. This 
includes deciding whether values are subjective or objective, and final or 
instrumental. 
2. Determine the available alternatives. 
3. Decide whether some alternative is demanded by principle. If so, act. 
4. Decide whether some alternatives are forbidden by principle. If so, exclude 
them from further consideration. If only one alternative is not forbidden, 
act. 
5. Estimate for each alternative the possible outcomes and the (approximate) 
probability of each outcome. 
6. Estimate the consequences of each outcome in terms of each value, adjust 
for bias. 
7. Decide whether the consideration of some values are forbidden by 
principle and if so disregard these values. 




9a. If values are commensurable: Estimate or decide the overall value of each 
alternative, act on the best alternative. 
 
Or: 
9b. If values are incommensurable: Act on the alternative with the most 
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